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On 12 December 2015, Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) adopted a new c
treaty. The Paris Agreement potentially breaks the impasse that for several years affected international climate governance, by
opening the way to enhanced universal action to address climate change.
The climate regime, consisting of the UNFCCC and of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, had over the years become
increasingly inadequate to deliver the transition towards low carbon economies necessary to avert catastrophic climate change
Building upon a static differentiation between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries,[1] the Kyoto Protocol imposed emission
reduction targets only on the first. With ever growing emissions in emerging economies, like China and India, however, scientis
repeatedly flagged that reducing emissions in developed countries only would not be enough. Furthermore, political will underp
the Kyoto Protocol had significantly faltered. Some developed countries that had initially undertaken emissions reductions
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol – ie Canada and the US – have retreated, either by refusing to ratify or by dis-ratifying 
protocol. Others – ie Japan, New Zealand and the Russian Federation – have declined to undertake targets for the second
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The faltering support for the Kyoto Protocol has left the European Union and a hand
developed countries, including Australia, Norway and Switzerland, as the sole Parties with emission reduction targets under th
Protocol. Taken together, these set of circumstances made the extant legal framework untenable and inadequate to tackle clim
change.
Starting with the ill-fated Copenhagen Climate Change Conference in 2009,[2] Parties to the climate regime have progressively
away from the ‘targets and timetables’ approach to international climate change law embedded in the Kyoto Protocol,[3] replaci
with a ‘pledge and review’ approach.[4] This new approach entails that UNFCCC Parties unilaterally declare the action they are
to undertake.[5]In this process, UNFCCC institutions and processes act as a ‘notary’ collecting, and eventually enabling the rev
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the implementation of Parties’ pledged action. This approach has been described as ‘bottom up’, as it leaves a very wide marg
discretion to States on how to contribute to the endeavor of tackling climate change, therefore contrasting with the rather more
prescriptive ‘top down’ approach embedded in the Kyoto Protocol.
Since 2009, UNFCCC Parties have painstakingly negotiated measures to review what they have pledged to do.[6] The mechan
established to address this tricky question have only just started to be tested. One evident stumbling block, however, is that Pa
have reported their pledges as they see fit – for example, choosing different years as a baseline to measure their emission red
– thus engendering a great deal of confusion as to what they are actually committing to do. Another stumbling block was the a
of means to sanction lack of compliance and to ratchet Parties’ ambition. So, while ahead of Paris an intergovernmental proces
encapsulate and review Parties’ bottom-up efforts had been created, this process needed to be perfected and strengthened.
The Paris Climate Change Conference held in December 2015 was expected to set the bases for a new ‘hybrid’ architecture, b
together Parties’ pledged action under a unitary framework.[7] The conference was expected to adopt ‘a protocol, another lega
instrument or a legal outcome’ applicable to ‘all Parties’ to be implemented from 2020.[8] In principle at least, this new instrume
could adopt a new approach to differentiation, with emission reduction commitments for all Parties.[9]
The road to Paris was long and winding, and, on the eve of the conference, only limited progress had been made on the devel
of a text for the new agreement.[10] Yet, after two weeks of intense work, the conference concluded with the adoption of the Pa
Agreement. The new treaty is not meant to replace the UNFCCC, but simply to enhance its implementation,[11] arguably workin
protocol in everything but name.[12]
The Paris Agreement dismantles the approach to differentiation embedded in the Kyoto Protocol, by requesting that all Parties
efforts to reduce their emissions, with a view to keeping the increase in global average temperature well below 2° C as compar
pre-industrial times.[13] Most importantly, the Paris Agreement builds on and institutionalizes the bottom up architecture that em
after the Copenhagen debacle, endowing it with measures for the review and the ratcheting up of ambition. Thus, not only doe
Paris Agreement provide that all Parties make efforts to reduce their emissions, but it also sets the basis for an architecture to 
action, and enhance it, when needed. It does so by sketching a framework to review both progress towards achieving the glob
goal,[14] as well as each Party’s contribution to it.[15] This review process will build upon, enhance, and eventually supersede ex
arrangements under the UNFCCC.[16] Although the details of the process largely remain to be determined, Parties will submit
information concerning action they intend to undertake to implement the Paris Agreement every 5 years,[17] with a quinquennia
stocktake starting in 2023.[18]
Whilst it is clear that Parties’ action proposed to date will be insufficient to achieve the temperature goal identified in the Paris
Agreement, in theory at least there will be means to revise and increase the level of ambition. How this will happen in practice,
however, remains to be seen. The same may be said with regard to the expert-based, facilitative compliance mechanism to be
established under the new treaty.[19] In this regard, the adoption of the Paris Agreement is just the beginning of a new, predicta
long, regulatory season, whereby Parties will flesh out the processes and the rules to assist its implementation.[20]
This issue of QIL reflects on the outcome of the Paris Conference and on how international climate law has changed since the
adoption of the UNFCCC. In particular, it reflects on the role of law in what has become a ‘bottom-up’ system of unilateral actio
address climate change,[21] and on the means that the Paris Agreement has laid out to ensure that the aggregate level of effort
commensurate with the sizeable task at hand. From the perspective of international law, this raises fundamental questions con
the role of review and compliance in the climate regime. What is the role of international law in a bottom-up climate governance
system? What means does the Paris Agreement provide to ensure the review of implementation and address the matter of
compliance? And are these processes likely to be fit for purpose? We have invited two experts renowned for their work on the
international climate change law, Harro van Asselt and Christina Voigt, to provide a response to these intriguing questions.
[1] UNFCCC, Annexes I and II.
[2] Decision 2/CP.15, Copenhagen Accord, FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1.
[3] L Rajamani, ‘From Berlin to Bali and Beyond: Killing Kyoto Softly’ (2008) 57 ICLQ 909; and D Bodansky, ‘W[h]ither the Kyoto
Protocol? Durban and Beyond’ (Harvard Project on Climate Agreements 2011) <www.c2es.org/docUploads/whither-kyoto-proto
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durban-and-beyond.pdf>.
[4] H van Asselt, M Mehling, C Siebert, ‘The Changing Architecture of International Climate Change Law’ in G van Calster, W
Vanderberghe, L Reins (eds), Research Handbook on Climate Change Mitigation Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015).
[5] See for example D Bodansky, E Diringer, ‘The Evolution of Multilateral Regimes: Implications for Climate Change’ (Pew Cen
Global Climate Change 2010) <www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/evolution-multilateral-regimes-implications-climate-change.pd
D Bodansky, ‘A Tale of Two Architectures: The Once and Future U.N. Climate Change Regime’ (2011) <http://papers.ssrn.com
/abstract= 1773865>.
[6] Decision 1/CP.16, Cancun Agreements, paras 44-46 and paras 63-64.
[7] D Bodansky, ‘The Durban Platform: Issues and Options for a 2015 Agreement’ (Social Science Research Network 2012) SS
Scholarly Paper ID 2270336 <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2270336>.
[8] Decision 1.CP/17, Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, FCCC/CP/2011
/Add.1, 2 and 4.
[9] L Rajamani, ‘The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action and the Future of the Climate Regime’ (2012) 61 ICLQ 501.
[10] A Savaresi, ‘UN Climate Change Negotiations: Last Tango in Paris?’ EJIL: Talk! <www.ejiltalk.org/un-climate-change-negot
last-tango-in-paris/>.
[11] Paris Agreement, art 2.
[12] A Savaresi, ‘The Paris Agreement: A New Beginning?’ (2016) 34 J Energy and Natural Resources L 1, 5.
[13] Paris Agreement, arts 1(a), 3 and 4.
[14] Paris Agreement, art 14.
[15] Paris Agreement, art 13.
[16] Decision 1/CP.21, 99.
[17] Paris Agreement, art 4.9.
[18] Paris Agreement, art 14.2.
[19] Paris Agreement, art 15.
[20] On the law-making powers of COPs, see RR Churchill and G Ulfstein, ‘Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilater
Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law’ (2000) 94 AJIL 623, 638-641.
[21] On the legal nature of the Paris Agreement see F Sindico, ‘Is the Paris Agreement really Legally Binding?’ (2015) SCELG P
Brief <www.strath.ac.uk/media/1newwebsite/departmentsubject/law/climatechangelawpolicy/SCELG_policy_brief.pdf>
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